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EU employment equality law is the product of fifty years of law-making. This gradual evolution has led 
to fragmentation and differences in the protection afforded to protected grounds, often referred to as 
a ‘hierarchy of discrimination grounds’. This paper argues that human dignity is one of the underlying 
values of EU equality law, and therefore, the existence of a ‘hierarchy’ is not deliberate, but rather the 
accidental product of progressive waves of legislative evolution. It is thus submitted that EU equality 
law should keep evolving to achieve a coherent approach to address discrimination. This requires a legal 
framework that is logical and consistent and aligned with international human rights instruments. On 
this basis, the paper discusses two proposals to improve the coherence of EU employment equality law, 
namely, explicitly prohibiting gender identity discrimination and embracing reasonable accommodation 
for religious practices through a broad interpretation of the concept of indirect discrimination. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last fifty years, EU equality law has come a long way. Its origins can be traced back to 
the right to equal pay between men and women, initially conceived as a market right to prevent 
unfair competition.2 However, from the 1970s equal treatment started to be perceived as a 
social right, which was progressively developed through secondary legislation.3  After the Treaty 
of Amsterdam introduced what is now article 19 TFEU (ex article 13 EC), two directives 
expanded the prohibition of employment discrimination to five completely new protected 
grounds, ie race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age and sexual orientation.4 These were 
followed by additional secondary legislation, such as the Recast Directive in 2006,5 in what 
seemed to be a never-ending process of enacting new and revised equality legislation, until the 
2008 financial crisis provoked a change in policy and legislative priorities. 
This progressive evolution has led to a fragmented legal framework, where different 
discrimination grounds are covered by different Directives. Whilst the definitions of the 
prohibited forms of discrimination have been harmonised, differences remain between the 
levels of protection afforded for different grounds. A wealth of academic commentators have 
criticized these divergences for creating a ‘hierarchy of equalities’,6 whilst others have sought to 
1 Lecturer in Employment Law, Law School and Work Futures Research Centre, University of Southampton. 
2 But cf with the CJEU’s interpretation of the purpose of former article 117 EEC in Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:56, paras 11-12. 
3 eg Council Directive (EC) 76/207 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women 
as regards access to employment, vocation training and promotion and working conditions OJ 1976 L39/40. 
4 Council Directives (EC) 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin OJ 2000 L 180/22 (RED) and 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation OJ 2000 L 303/16 (EED). 
5 Parliament and Council (EC) Directive 2006/54 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and 
equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) OJ 2006 L204/23. 
6 eg S Fredman, ‘Equality: A New Generation?’ (2001) 30 ILJ 145; L Waddington and M Bell, ‘More Equal than Others: 
Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives’ (2001) 38 CMLRev 587; E Howard, ‘The case for a considered 
hierarchy of discrimination grounds in EU law’ (2006) 13 MJ 445. 
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understand whether there might be reasons for providing different levels of protection for 
different grounds.7 This paper builds on that literature to consider whether more coherence is 
needed in the field of EU employment equality law and, if so, how it could be achieved. 
On the other hand, having in mind that enforcement of EU equality law at national level 
remains problematic, some argue that, in the next years, the EU focus should not be on 
generating more legislation and institutions, but rather on improving the existing ones.8 Whilst 
recognising that better enforcement mechanisms are needed, this paper contends that more 
substantive coherence in the protection afforded to different discrimination grounds is also 
required, even if this entails enacting new legislation, particularly now that the economic crisis 
seems to be coming to an end.9 In this context, the central question that the paper addresses is: 
How should EU employment equality law evolve to be more coherent? In a European Union with 
increasingly ageing population, where the gender pay gap is still 20%,10 and where aversion to 
ethnic and religious diversity seems to be growing,11 addressing these challenges is crucial. 
In this context, the term ‘coherence’ is used to refer to a legal framework which is ‘logical and 
consistent’12 in itself and that is aligned with the foundations of EU equality law. In addition, 
following Schwellnus, I refer to two dimensions of ‘coherence’: internal coherence, when proposals 
for change would bring EU rules in line with pre-existing EU legislation and policies; external 
coherence, when proposals for change would bring EU rules in line with international human 
rights instruments. 13  Both dimensions are considered as potential reasons for introducing 
changes to EU equality law. 
The paper starts by briefly recalling the evolution of EU equality law (section 2). It then analyses 
the theoretical foundations for improving the coherence of EU equality law (section 3) and 
finally suggests two avenues to improve substantive coherence (section 4), namely, expressly 
prohibiting gender identity discrimination (sub-section 4(a)) and extending the duty of 
reasonable accommodation to religion or belief (sub-section 4(b)). 
2. The piecemeal evolution of EU equality law: from a market right to a fundamental right 
This section briefly revisits the deep transformation that EU equality law has undergone in the 
last 50 years, with an emphasis on its progressive evolution from a market right to a social and 
then to a fundamental right. 
The first expression of the right to equal treatment at EU level was the principle of equal pay, 
established in article 119 EEC (current article 157 TFEU). The only other treaty provision 
which dealt with equality was article 6 EEC (current article 18 TFEU), which prohibited 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. Both articles had a clear market rationale: article 119 
7 eg D Schiek, “A new framework on equal treatment of persons in EC Law?” (2002) 8 ELJ 290, 308; Bell and 
Waddington, ‘Reflecting on inequalities in European equality law’ (2003) 6 ELRev 349, 355-358. 
8 T E Givens and R E Case, Legislating equality: The politics of antidiscrimination policy in Europe (OUP 2014) 130. 
9 European Central Bank, Economic Bulletin, Issue 7/2015, 3. 
10 EIGE, Gender Equality Index 2015 - Measuring gender equality in the European Union 2005-2012: Report (EIGE 2015) 37. 
11 See eg H E Busemann, ‘Merkel, heckled on visit to refugees, says no to xenophobia’ (26 August 2015) Reuters 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/26/us-europe-migrants-merkel-
idUSKCN0QV1LL20150826#TFThhkkEcxQdc8YZ.97> accessed 20 November 2015; ‘New report highlights 
“sharp rise” in anti-Muslim attacks and ‘environment of hate’ in Britain’ The Independent (18 November 2015). 
12 A Stevenson (ed), Oxford dictionary of English (3rd ed, OUP 2010). 
13 G Schwellnus, ‘Reasons for constitutionalization: non-discrimination, minority rights and social rights in the 
Convention on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, in B Rittberger and F Schimmelfenning (eds), The 
Constitutionalization of the European Union (Routledge 2007) 118, 119-120. 
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sought to prevent unfair competition; 14 article 6 was necessary to ensure the free movement of 
persons within the common market. 15  However, article 119 EEC acquired more social 
prominence thanks to the ‘judicial activism’ of the CJEU, which recognised its direct effect16 
and established that it also had social objectives.17 
In the 1970s, however, the Community realised that the common market needed a ‘human face’, 
and the development of social policies was perceived as a valid means to achieve that.18 Hence, 
following the adoption of the Social Action Programme,19 article 119 EEC was supplemented 
with a ‘corpus’20 of secondary legislation which went far beyond equal pay, such as Directive 
76/207/EEC on equal treatment for men and women in employment.21 
In a third stage, the Community started to recognise equal treatment not only as a social right, 
but also as a fundamental right. The 1989 Community Charter on fundamental social rights for 
workers22 established the right to equal treatment between men and women in article 16, which 
was implemented23 through secondary legislation, such as Directive 97/80/EC on the burden 
of proof in sex discrimination cases.24 
Following the insertion of the citizenship provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, the CJEU 
expanded the scope of protection against nationality discrimination to cover, in some instances, 
citizens who were not economically active.25 Nationality discrimination seemed thus ‘to be in a 
process of transition from a free movement right to a fundamental right’.26 And this process was 
arguably extended more broadly to the right to equal treatment as a result of the insertion of 
article 13 EC (current article 19 TFEU) in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, enabling the 
Community to adopt non-discrimination legislation on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.27 This was developed through 
Directive 43/2000 prohibiting racial discrimination within and outside employment (‘Race 
Equality Directive’, RED), and Directive 78/2000 prohibiting discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation in employment (only) (‘Employment 
Equality Directive’, EED). These directives were praised, inter alia, for expanding the scope of 
14 Defrenne (n 2), para 9. See also A Christensen, ‘Structural Aspects of Anti-Discriminatory Legislation and Processes 
of Normative Change’, in A Numhauser-Henning (ed), Legal Perspectives on Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination 
(Kluwer 2001) 52. 
15 S O’Leary, ‘Free Movement of Persons and Services’, in P Craig and G De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd 
ed, OUP 2011) 499. 
16 Case 80/70 Defrenne v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:1971:55. 
17 Namely, preventing unfair competition between companies established in different MS, many of which had not yet 
passed equal pay laws, see Defrenne (n 2) para 10. 
18 P Teague, ‘Labour Market Governance in the New Europe’ (1994) 16 Employee Relations 5, 6. 
19 [1974] OJ C12. 
20 M Bell, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening’, in P Craig and G De Búrca (eds), The evolution 
of EU law (OUP 2011) 611, 615. 
21 This Directive had to be passed relying on the flexibility clause of article 235 EEC (current article 352 TFEU); see 
further P Watson, EU Social and Employment Law. Policy and Practice in an Enlarged Europe (OUP 2009) 48-49. 
22 Social Europe 1/90, 46-50 <http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/community-charter--en.pdf> accessed 20 
November 2015. 
23 On implementation difficulties see Watson (n 21) 56-57. 
24 OJ L 14. 
25 See eg Cases C-85/96 Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern ECLI:EU:C:1998:217, paras 61-64; C-184/99 Grzelczyk 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, paras 31-35; C-224/98 D’Hoop v Office national de l’emploi ECLI:EU:C:2002:432, paras 25-28. See 
further M Poiares Maduro, ‘Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and Social Rights in the EU’, 
in P Alston, M Bustelo and J Heenan (eds), The EU and Human Rights (OUP 1999) 449, 456-457. 
26 Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (OUP 2002) 39. 
27 See A Masselot, ‘The State of Gender Equality Law in the European Union’ (2007) 13 ELJ 152. 
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EU equality law beyond gender and nationality discrimination. However, they were also 
criticized for creating a ‘hierarchy’ of discrimination grounds,28 where race was at the top,29 
given the RED’s wider material scope, its limited exceptions, and the duty to set up national 
equality bodies (not required for the other grounds). The EED also introduced a special feature 
for disability discrimination: the employer’s duty of reasonable accommodation. 30  Whilst 
protection against gender discrimination was initially left behind, it was quickly brought in line 
with that available for race with the adoption of Directive 2002/73, followed by the Recast 
Directive 2006/54, which harmonised employment gender equality law. On the other hand, age 
was considered to be at the bottom of the hierarchy,31 but it could be argued that the ground 
which was really at the bottom was –and still is– gender reassignment.32 
Equal treatment’s status as a fundamental right within EU law was confirmed, finally, with the 
insertion of article 21(1) in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, adopted in 2000.33 Although 
the Charter only applies in the implementation of EU law by EU institutions and MS,34 and it 
cannot be utilized to extend the competences of the Union,35 it signifies in a more visible and 
vigorous manner the EU’s commitment towards protecting equal treatment as a fundamental 
right.36 
Overall, whilst the right to equal treatment seems to have consolidated its fundamental right 
status within EU law, and an increasing number of academics are referring to the 
constitutionalization of the EU right to equal treatment,37 this piecemeal evolution has left 
some inconsistencies behind, which cast doubts on the robustness of EU law’s protection in 
this field. In fact, in the same way that EU citizenship is still perceived by some as a market 
right rather than as the fundamental status of Union citizens,38 these inconsistencies in the right 
to equal treatment could be a sign that, despite its formal consolidation as a fundamental right, 
it is still, in practice, more a market right than a fundamental right. Addressing this lack of 
coherence seems essential to strengthen the EU right to equal treatment as a constitutional 
right. 
3. The theoretical foundations of the need for coherence: dignity and the EU concept of 
equality 
As discussed in section 2, EU equality directives are the product of a progressive development, 
which has led to piecemeal legislation and inconsistencies. It thus seems logical to reflect on 
28 eg Waddington and Bell (n 6) 587; E Howard, ‘The case for a considered hierarchy of discrimination grounds in 
EU law’ (2006) 13 MJ 445. 
29 Waddington and Bell, ibid 590. 
30 Art 5 EED; see also L Waddington and A Hendriks, ‘The Expanding Concept of Employment Discrimination in 
Europe: From Direct and Indirect Discrimination to Reasonable Accommodation Discrimination’ (2002) 18 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 403. 
31 ibid 610. 
32 See section (4)(a). 
33 [2000] OJ C364/1. Note that the Charter also contains other more specific rights which are connected to equal 
treatment, namely arts 20, 22-26.  
34 Art 51(1) Charter. 
35 Art 6(1) TEU and art 51(2) Charter. 
36 P Craig and G De Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (6th ed, OUP 2015) 396. 
37  See eg A Morris, ‘Constitutionalising Equality in the European Union: Tolerance and Hierarchies’ (2005) 8 
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 33; M Bell, ‘Constitutionalization and EU Employment Law’ in 
H-W Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European private law (OUP 2014); C O’Cinneide, ‘The Constitutionalization of 
Equality within the EU Legal Order. Sexual Orientation as a Testing Ground’ (2015) 22 MJ 370. 
38 See N N Shuibhne, ‘The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship’ (2010) 47 CMLRev 1597, 1598, 1608-1609. 
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the different levels of protection afforded for different discrimination grounds to establish 
whether they are random and undesired, or on the contrary, they are based on sound motives. 
Some authors have suggested that the divergences between EU equality directives and the 
‘hierarchy’ between EU equality grounds was not deliberately introduced, but rather the result 
of ‘political pragmatism’. 39 For instance, Waddington and Bell explain these divergences on the 
basis of the (lack of) familiarity of some MS with novel protected grounds, differences in the 
perceived levels of disadvantage suffered by target groups, varying levels of pressure exerted by 
lobby groups, and hidden secondary goals linked to some of the grounds.40 Remarkably, all 
these justifications are circumstantial: they are not based on sound theoretical differences 
between the grounds, but rather on contingent considerations. 
Besides, a number of commentators have contended that all discrimination grounds should be 
afforded the same level of protection because ‘prejudice is rarely limited to a specific category 
of persons’41 and the protected grounds, whether they are biologically determined, socially 
established or personally chosen,42 are part of a person’s ‘inherent identity’.43 However, arguing 
that all grounds should be treated alike may overlook that different discrimination grounds may 
require different approaches to achieve substantive equality.44 For instance, different protected 
grounds may demand different promotion techniques due to the number of people affected 
and to economic and social considerations.45 Furthermore, individuals bearing some protected 
characteristics, such as the disabled, older persons, pregnant women, and some religious 
minorities, may temporarily or permanently not be able to perform some tasks or have different 
‘availability or ability’ to perform some work.46 These individuals may indeed require reasonable 
accommodation measures to perform certain jobs, whilst this is not normally the case for 
individuals suffering discrimination on grounds of race or sexual orientation. 
For our purposes, the key question is whether having different levels of protection for different 
discrimination grounds suits the EU approach to equal treatment. The EU equality directives 
combine a formal and a substantive approach to equality: on the one hand, the definitions of 
direct and indirect discrimination are still based on comparisons;47 yet, on the other, they seek 
to put into effect the principle of equal treatment48 and, to achieve that, they establish, inter alia, an 
obligation to provide protection against victimisation49 or to the shift of the burden of proof,50 
and they allow positive action.51 Whilst the CJEU has not always been consistent in interpreting 
39 Howard (n 6) 456. 
40 Bell and Waddington (n 7) 363-368; but cf Schiek (n 7) 308. 
41 Morris (n 37) 39. 
42 cf Schiek (n 7) 308. 
43 Morris (n 37) 40. 
44 P J Neuvonen, ‘Inequality in equality’ in the European Union equality directives: A friend or a foe of more 
systematized relationships between protected grounds?’ (2015) 15 International Journal of Discrimination and the 
Law 222, 228. 
45 Bell and Waddington (n 7) 355-358. 
46 ibid, 359. 
47 Arts 2(2) RED; 2(2) EED; 2(1)(a)-(b) Recast Directive. 
48 Arts 1 RED; 1 EED. Art 1 of the Recast Directive refers to ensuring ‘the implementation’ of the principle of equal 
treatment. 
49 Arts 9 RED; 11 EED; 24 Recast Directive. 
50 Arts 8 RED; 10 EED; 19 Recast Directive. 
51 Arts 7 EED; 5 EED; 3 Recast Directive. 
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the directives,52 it has implicitly relied on a substantive approach to equality to deliver landmark 
judgments, such as P v S53 and Coleman.54 
Substantive equality can be linked to the notion of dignity,55 ie the idea that all human beings 
are worth equal respect and treatment regardless their personal characteristics. This connection 
between substantive equality and dignity has been emphasized in several jurisdictions, notably 
in Canada and South Africa.56 For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that human 
dignity entails that every individual deserves equal ‘concern, respect and consideration’57 and, 
whilst accepting that different individuals may have ‘different needs, capacities and merits’,58 it 
considers that ‘our society cannot tolerate legislative distinctions that treat certain people as second 
class citizens’.59 
In EU law, the connection between dignity and equality may be less obvious, but it can also be 
traced, and it can be valuable to determine the level of protection to be afforded for each 
discrimination ground. For example, in P v S, the CJEU argued that gender reassignment 
discrimination fell within the scope of sex discrimination and could not be ‘tolerated’ because 
it ‘would be tantamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom 
to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to safeguard.’60 Several Advocates 
General have also referred to dignity as an underlying value of the concept of equality. For 
instance, Poiares Maduro has noted that ‘[i]n order to determine what equality requires in any 
given case it is useful to recall the values underlying equality. These are human dignity and 
personal autonomy’.61 Cruz Villalón has also emphasized that 
[t]he members of the political community, and by extension human beings, are equal in dignity, in the 
sense of the dignity of the individual, and this human dignity has been translated into an, initially limited, 
range of specific prohibitions on discrimination, with their formulation being closely linked to the 
evolving state of our constitutional culture. Today, Article 21 of the Charter, immediately following on 
from the general principle of equality laid down by Article 20, contains as many as fifteen unlawful 
grounds of discrimination.62 
Cruz Villalón seems to imply that the EU’s ‘initially limited’ protection against discrimination is 
indeed based on circumstantial reasons, and not on weighty theoretical motives, given that all 
human beings ‘are equal in dignity’ and that nowadays article 21 of the Charter contains fifteen 
expressly prohibited discrimination grounds –and, I would add, an open-ended prohibition, 
52 See eg O’Cinneide (n 37) 383-394. 
53 Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall CC ECLI:EU:C:1996:170; see further C Barnard, ‘P v S: Kite Flying or a New 
Constitutional Approach?’ in A Dashwood and S O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law (Sweet & 
Maxwell 1997) 59. 
54  Case C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law ECLI:EU:C:2008:415. The CJEU has also referred to 
‘substantive equality’ explicitly, see eg Case C‑537/07, Gomez-Limon Sanchez-Camacho v INSS, TGSS and Alcampo SA 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:462, fn 54; Case C-363/12, Z v A Government department and The Board of management of a community 
school ECLI:EU:C:2014:159, para 10. 
55 J Small and E Grant, ‘Dignity, Discrimination, and Context: New Directions in South African and Canadian Human 
Rights Law’ (2005) 6 Human Rights Review 25; S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd ed, OUP 2012) 19. 
56 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 1; see also Small and Grant, ibid; R O’Connell, ‘The role of 
dignity in equality law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
267. 
57 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143, 171. 
58 Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration [1999] 1 SCR 497, 530. 
59 ibid, 51. 
60 P v S (n 53) para 22. 
61 AG Opinion in Coleman (n 54) ECLI:EU:C:2008:61, para 8. 
62 AG Opinion in Case C-447/09 Prigge v Lufthansa ECLI:EU:C:2011:321, para 31. 
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which can extend its application to additional grounds. Moreover, the link between EU equality 
and human dignity is also supported by the preamble and article 20 of the Charter,63 and by the 
EU prohibition of harassment, which requires that the unwanted conduct has ‘the purpose or 
the effect of violating the dignity of a person’.64 
This can indeed indicate that a hierarchy of discrimination grounds was never meant to exist in 
EU law. In fact, the Council has declared that ‘the different forms of discrimination cannot be 
ranked: all are equally intolerable’.65 So in the same way that the current legal framework is the 
product of decades of evolution, it could be argued that it should keep evolving and improving 
to develop –in the words of the Commission– ‘a coherent and integrated approach towards the fight 
against discrimination’, whilst also ‘recognising the specific challenges faced by different 
groups’. 66  It thus seems justified to revise the EU legal framework to remove random 
inconsistencies in the level of protection afforded to different discrimination grounds, but 
taking into account substantive differences between the grounds, which may require different 
courses of action to address inequality. 
4. Two proposals to improve coherence 
In order to illustrate the proposed approach, the present section considers how to address two 
inconsistencies that arguably undermine the coherence of EU equality law: the lack of express 
binding protection for gender identity discrimination (sub-section a) and the fact that the duty of 
reasonable accommodation only applies to people with disabilities (sub-section b).67 
a. Gender reassignment: the Cinderella of discrimination grounds? 
Gender reassignment is the only discrimination ground which is deemed to be protected under 
EU law but is not explicitly outlawed in legislation. Since the ruling in P v S68 in 1996, ‘sex’ 
discrimination has been interpreted as including gender reassignment discrimination.69 More 
recently, recital 3 of the Recast Directive established that ‘the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women […] also applies to discrimination arising from the gender reassignment of a 
person’. However, only eight MS have expressly prohibited gender reassignment 
discrimination.70 Whilst in some MS gender equality law is being interpreted as prohibiting gender 
reassignment discrimination, 71  the lack of explicit legislation can arguably hinder the 
dissemination of the prohibition at social level. Indeed, legislation can have positive symbolic 
effects, particularly when it is accompanied by responsive policy measures and interaction with 
63 See also art 35 in connection with the rights of the elderly. 
64 Arts 2(3) RED, 2(3) EED, 2(1)(c) Recast Directive. See also G S Friedman and J Q Whitman, ‘The European 
Transformation of Harassment Law: Discrimination versus Dignity’ (2002) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 241. 
65  Council (EC), Decision of 27 of November 2000 establishing a Community action programme to combat 
discrimination (2001 to 2006) [2000] OJ L 303/23. 
66 Commission (EC), Equality and Non-Discrimination in an Enlarged European Union’, Green Paper (2004) 10. 
67 Whilst additional improvement proposals could have been made, due to space constraints, these two were chosen 
due to their salience. 
68 P v S (n 53). 
69 ibid paras 20-21. The CJEU has applied this principle in two other cases: Case C-117/01 K.B. v National Health Service 
Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health ECLI:EU:C:2004:7; Case C-423/04 Richards v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions ECLI:EU:C:2006:256. 
70 Namely, Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, UK, Slovakia, Malta, Germany and Hungary. See Commission (EU), 
‘Report on the application of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 
on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (recast)’ COM(2013) 861 final 5. 
71 In Denmark, Ireland, Spain, France, Cyprus, Austria and Croatia, ibid 5-6. 
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target groups.72 The lack of an express prohibition of gender identity discrimination may thus 
have some bearing on the fact that 41% of respondents to an EU survey were not aware of 
laws prohibiting gender identity discrimination in employment, whereas the rate was lower for 
sexual orientation discrimination,73 which is explicitly outlawed at the EU level (and hence, also 
at the domestic level). What is more, data suggest that transgender people rarely report 
discrimination, not only because they are afraid of being identified and victimised, but also 
because they are unaware of their rights and how to exercise them.74 
Besides contributing to the dissemination of rights, legislation can also have an ‘expressive 
function’:75 by recognising key social values, it can elevate them to a higher level and signpost 
a community’s commitment to ensure that they are respected. Hence, the fact that 20 MS do 
not explicitly outlaw gender reassignment may partly explain why, among LGTB people, 
transgender people are the ones who suffer higher levels of discrimination, both in access to 
employment (30%) and in employment (23%).76 
On the other hand, the three gender identity cases which have reached the CJEU so far 
concerned people who had undergone gender reassignment surgery, so it is unclear whether 
trans people who have not undergone reassignment or do not intend to are protected against 
discrimination.77 Furthermore, this interpretative solution is not entirely satisfactory because 
gender reassignment ‘is only one particular aspect of the broad spectrum of discrimination on 
grounds of gender identity and gender expression’.78 Indeed, the term ‘trans’ is generally used 
to refer to people ‘whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from the sex 
assigned to them at birth’,79 which includes, inter alia, people who live in their desired gender on 
a continuous basis without undergoing gender reassignment medical treatment and/or surgery, 
as well as people who occasionally cross-dress. 80 Furthermore, many trans people do not 
understand gender in binary terms: they may see themselves as ‘more than male and more than 
female’, or as neither male nor female.81 
Whether trans people decide to undergo gender reassignment or not, the origin of 
discriminatory conducts against them is always the same, ie the fact that their preferred gender 
identity differs –always or at some point– from the sex that they were physically given at birth, 
or as Bell puts it, the fact that their behaviour ‘does not conform to social norms about gender-
appropriate conduct’.82 The broader concept of ‘gender identity’ is thus much more appropriate 
72 W J Witteveen, ‘Turning to communication in the study of legislation’ in N Zeegers, W Witteveen and B Van Klink 
(eds), Social and Symbolic Effects of Legislation under the Rule of Law (Edwin Mellen 2005) 17, 30-31; see also R Schwitters, 
‘Symbols work’, in Zeegers, Witteveen and Van Klink (ibid) 89, 91. 
73 FRA, European Union lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender survey: Main results (EUPO 2014) 43-44. 
74 Equinet, Making Equality Legislation work for Trans People (Equinet 2010) 6-7. 
75 Witteven (n 72) 31. 
76 FRA, European Union lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender survey: Main results (EUPO 2014) 29. 
77 S Agius and C Tobler, Trans and intersex people. Discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender identity and gender 
expression (Human European Consultancy-MPG 2011) 43. 
78 ibid. 
79 FRA, Being Trans in the European Union: Comparative analysis of EU LGBT survey data (EUPO 2014) 14. 
80 For a more comprehensive discussion of the meaning of ‘trans people’, see Agius and Tobler (n 77) 12-13. 
81 V Baird, ‘Transgender identities: like stars in the sky’ in S Plous (ed), Understanding prejudice and discrimination (McGraw-
Hill 2003) 415. 
82 M Bell, ‘Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation: Alternative Pathways in EU Equality Law’ (2012) 60 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 127, 134. 
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to cover the whole spectrum of situations which may give rise to discrimination against trans 
people.83 
This concept is increasingly being used by international human rights bodies and has led to an 
upsurge in recommendations to expressly prohibit gender identity discrimination at national level. 
Already in 2006, the Yogyakarta Principles established that states should ‘[t]ake all necessary 
legislative, administrative and other measures to eliminate and prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of […] gender identity’ in employment.84 In 2009 the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights made clear that the term ‘other status’ in article 2(2) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights includes gender identity.85 In 2012, the UN Office of 
the Human Rights Commissioner recommended to include gender identity as a discrimination 
ground.86 And more recently, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
called on member states to ‘explicitly prohibit discrimination based on gender identity in national 
non-discrimination legislation and include the human rights situation of transgender people in 
the mandate of national human rights institutions, with an explicit reference to gender identity’.87 
Within the EU, the Fundamental Rights Agency has also recommended that EU law expressly 
forbids discrimination on grounds of gender identity.88 
It is therefore clear that there is an emerging international trend which considers gender identity 
as a ‘suspect’ ground89 that should be explicitly included in anti-discrimination legislation. From 
a social perspective, the Eurobarometer also shows a growing acceptance of diverse gender 
identities: in 2015, 53% of respondents were comfortable or indifferent with having a 
transgender or transsexual person in the highest political office (compared to 43% in 2012) and 
67% would be comfortable with or indifferent to working with a transgender or transsexual 
person.90 
An EU which is truly committed to respect dignity, equality and human rights91 and aspires to 
become a member of the ECHR 92  should embrace the growing international and social 
acceptance of diverse gender identities by going beyond the uncertain case-law based protection. 
Indeed, the real scope of the CJEU interpretation in P v S and subsequent cases is unclear. Does 
it only apply to gender reassignment or can it also apply more broadly to gender identity 
discrimination? Within the academic literature there is disagreement. For instance, Bell 
maintains that, given that the CJEU’s reasoning in P v S was partly based on the need ‘to respect 
83 See the definition in Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity <http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/> accessed 20 September 2015. 
84 ibid, principle 12. 
85 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, Non-Discrimination in Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (2009), at 32. 
86 UNHRHC, ‘Born free and equal. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law’ 
(2012) <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/BornFreeAndEqualLowRes.pdf> accessed 17 September 
2015, p. 13; see also Resolutions 17/19  and 27/32 Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, UN docs 
A/HRC/RES/17/19 and A/HRC/RES/27/32. 
87 PACE, Resolution 2048 (2015) Discrimination against transgender people in Europe, adopted on 22 April 2015 
(15th Sitting), at 6.1.1 (my italics). 
88  FRA, ‘LGBT persons' experiences of discrimination and hate crime in the EU and Croatia’ 
<http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu-lgbt-survey-factsheet_en.pdf> accessed 16 September 2015, 2. 
89 On this concept see J Gerards, ‘Discrimination Grounds’ in D Schiek, L Waddington and M Bell (eds), Cases, 
Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Hart 2007) 33, 35-36. See also 
Howard, who has argued that ‘suspectness’ could justify whether a discrimination ground is afforded more or less 
protection (n 6) 458-460. 
90 Special Eurobarometer 437. Discrimination in the EU in 2015 (Commission (EU) 2015) 61, 63. 
91 Art 2 TEU. See also art 8 TFEU. 
92 Art 6(2) TEU. 
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the freedom and dignity’ of the individual,93 ‘it remains possible that gender equality law can 
offer an effective vehicle for protection from gender identity discrimination’. 94  In contrast, 
Skidmore argues that the CJEU ruling in P v S is based on ‘the idea that sex can and should be 
categorized’ and that ‘[i]t does not yet open up the space for a continuum of sex and a spectrum 
of genders’,95 which certainly clashes with the idea of gender identity. In this context, it is 
submitted that the best way to address this uncertainty and to achieve external coherence with 
the growing international accord is to expressly prohibit gender identity discrimination in 
legislation. 
On a more pragmatic level, in the same way that differences in legislation on equal pay between 
men and women could have given rise to social dumping between MS in the 1950s, differences 
in protection against gender identity discrimination can also have negative consequences for 
the functioning of the internal market. Of course, women largely outnumber trans people, but 
there could be ‘1.5 million people in the EU who do not fully identify with the sex they were 
assigned at birth’,96 which is still a significant figure. 
Nevertheless, the lack of an obvious legal basis could be an obstacle to introduce an explicit 
prohibition of gender identity discrimination at EU level. Article 19 TFEU, which was the legal 
base used to enact the RED and the EED, contains a closed list of grounds which includes sex 
and sexual orientation, but not gender identity. It could be argued that the term ‘sex’ could be 
interpreted as including ‘gender identity’. The CJEU stated in P v S that gender reassignment 
discrimination ‘is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned’.97 
With this in mind, and considering that the CJEU has so far interpreted the term ‘sex’ as 
including gender reassignment, the term ‘sex’ in article 19 could perhaps be stretched to include 
‘gender identity’. However, this claim is likely to be controversial –especially from the 
perspective of MS– and could potentially lead to legal basis disputes.98 
The legal basis hurdle could perhaps be overcome more straightforwardly through the use of 
the general legal basis in article 352 TFEU.99 This provision was already used in the past to 
enact sex equality legislation (eg Directive 76/207/EEC) when there was not a specific legal 
basis, and it could arguably be used again in this context. However, as for article 19 TFEU, the 
requirement of unanimity at the Council sets a high threshold that would require a strong 
political will on the part of MS. In spite of this, Schwellnus claims that achieving external 
coherence tends to be a very strong argument for introducing legislative changes contributing 
to the constitutionalization of EU equality law. 100  Hence, the above-mentioned emerging 
agreement on the need to outlaw gender identity discrimination expressly, together with a wide 
mobilisation of civil society groups,101 and the growing social acceptance of diverse gender 
93 P v S (n 53) para 22. 
94 Bell (n 82) 138. 
95 P Skidmore, ‘Can Transsexuals Suffer Sex Discrimination?’ (1997) 19 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 105, 
109. 
96 Amnesty International, The State Decides Who I Am. Lack of Recognition for Transgender People (Amnesty International 
1014) 11, relying on G J Gates, How many people are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender? (Williams Institute 2011) 
<http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-Many-People-LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf> 
accessed 22 November 2015. 
97 para 21. 
98  See eg the dispute regarding article 114 TFEU in Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:544. 
99 Agius and Tobler (n 77) 32.  
100 Schwellnus (n 13) 124, 133. 
101 On the role of civil society organisations see eg I Solanke, Making anti-racial discrimination law: a comparative history of 
social action and anti-racial discrimination law (Routledge 2009). 
10 
 
                                                          
<<<Pre-proof version – Please refer to the journal article for quotations>>> 
identities, could potentially contribute to build momentum to explicitly prohibit gender identity 
discrimination at EU level. 
b. Reasonable accommodation for religion or belief 
A second aspect which arguably undermines the internal coherence of EU equality law is the 
limited availability of the duty of reasonable accommodation. Article 5 of the EED requires 
employers to ‘take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person 
with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo 
training, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer’. 
Whilst this duty, as such, is only expressly recognised as a tool to promote equal opportunities 
for the disabled, there is a similar –although not identical–102 EU law duty to accommodate 
working conditions for women who are pregnant or are breastfeeding, if the normal working 
conditions would entail risks for their health and safety.103 
In other jurisdictions, however, the duty to accommodate also applies to other protected 
characteristics, such as religion in both the US and Canada, and in addition, in Canada, gender, 
national origin and age are also covered. On this basis, the EU could consider extending the 
duty to accommodate to other protected grounds, namely age and religion. For instance, Bell 
and Waddington argue that: 
[EU] law establishes an obligation on employers to accommodate the specific needs of women, with 
regard to maternity, and people with disabilities, but makes no effort to provide similar rights to 
followers of (minority) religions or younger or older workers. This is in spite of the fact that age and 
religious belief, like pregnancy and disability, can sometimes affect the availability or ability to perform 
work. This inconsistency is further highlighted by the fact that the reasonable accommodation 
requirement covers religious followers in the United States, and has an even broader scope in 
Canada.104 
For reasons of space, however, this section only focuses on the possibility of extending 
reasonable accommodation to religious practices.105 
Nonetheless, importing the North-American approach towards religious accommodation to 
Europe may not be straightforward. For instance, in Canada, and particularly in Québec, 
extensive media coverage of a large number of religious accommodation cases in 2006-07 fed 
a general sentiment that accommodation was ‘illegitimate or a form of threat to Québec 
society’s values’.106 However, this led to extensive research and consultation by an advisory 
Commission, which then published a report calling for ‘reconciliation’.107 
Furthermore, in practice, it could be difficult to reach a unanimous agreement at the Council 
to amend the EED to introduce a religious accommodation duty. For instance, France would 
be likely to oppose such amendment to protect the constitutional principle of ‘secularism’, one 
102 E Bribosia and I Rovire, Reasonable Accommodation beyond Disability in Europe? (EUPO 2013) 40-41. 
103 Article 5(1) of Directive 92/85/EEC. 
104 Bell and Waddington (n 7) 359. 
105 Note that Malcom Sargeant has argued that reasonable accommodation should also extend to age (see ‘Older 
Workers and the Need for Reasonable Accommodation’ (2008) 9 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 
168). The recent Commission Proposal 2015/0278 (COD) goes in that direction for access to certain goods and 
services (see eg recital 25). 
106 T Bouchard  and C Taylor, Building the future, a time for reconciliation: Abridged report (Commission de consultation sur 
les pratiques d'accomodement reliées aux différences culturelles 2008). 
107 ibid. 
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of the core values of the French Republic.108 Under this principle, citizens who work in public 
schools are not allowed to wear visible religious symbols109 and those who work in ‘public 
spaces’ cannot wear clothing intended to conceal one’s face (eg full-face covering veils).110 
However, a reasonable accommodation duty could also be derived from the concept of indirect 
discrimination.111 Indeed, in Canada, the duty of reasonable accommodation initially arose out 
of the idea of substantive equality, which underpins the concept of ‘indirect discrimination’.112 
In Europe, the ECtHR has not expressly endorsed the concept of reasonable 
accommodation,113 but in Thlimmenos it clarified that: 
The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the 
Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat 
differently persons whose situations are significantly different.114 
In other words, signatory states should accommodate (‘treat differently’) persons who have 
different needs (‘whose situations are significantly different’) unless there is an ‘objective and 
reasonable justification’ not do it. In the case at hand, a Jehovah’s Witness who had successfully 
passed a competition to become a chartered accountant was not appointed to the post because 
he had been convicted for a serious crime due to his refusal -triggered by his religious beliefs- 
to undertake Greek military service. The Grand Chamber considered that ‘by failing to 
introduce appropriate exceptions to the rule barring persons convicted of a serious crime from 
the profession of chartered accountants’ Greece had discriminated against the applicant. The 
requirement to introduce ‘appropriate exceptions’ unless there is an ‘objective and reasonable 
justification’ not to do it, can be interpreted as an implicit endorsement to the need to 
accommodate religious differences. The approach of the ECtHR essentially consists in 
analysing the ‘reasonableness’ of accommodation as part of the objective justification test which 
is inherent to indirect discrimination, ie whether the failure to treat the claimant differently 
pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate.115 
The Thlimmenos principle was further developed in a disability case, Glor v Swisstzerland,116 but 
the ECtHR has been more reluctant to apply it in religious discrimination cases. However, most 
of those cases (including the ones that pre-date Thlimmenos) concerned situations where the 
applicant was treated differently in the education sector 117  or while working for a public 
108 See Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat and Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, 
art 1. 
109 Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues 
manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. 
110 Loi n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public. 
111 L Waddington, ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ (2011) 36 NTM/NJCM-Bulletin 41, 49; K Alidadi, ‘Reasonable 
accommodation for religion and belief: adding value to art. 9 ECHR and the EU’s anti-discrimination approach in 
employment?’ (2012) 37 ELRev 693, 707-710. 
112 Ontario Human Rights Commission (O’Malley) v Simpsons-Sears [1985] 2 SCR 536. 
113 However, explicit references were made in Sessa v Italy, App No 28790/08 (ECtHR, 2 April 2012), Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Popović and Keller, paras 9-15; Ebrahimian v France, App No 64846/11 (ECtHR, 26 
November 2015), Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge O’Leary. 
114 Thlimmenos v Greece, App No 34369/97 (ECtHR, 6 April 2000) para 44. 
115 As Tulkens, Popović and Keller have noted reasonable accommodation may ‘constitute a less restrictive means of 
achieving the aim pursued’ (n 113) para 9. 
116 App No 13444/04 (ECtHR, 30 April 2009). 
117 The interference being justified to protect vulnerable pupils and students from external religious pressures, see eg 
Dahlab v Turkey, App No 42393/98 (ECtHR, 15 February 2001); Karaduman v Turkey, App No 41296/04 (ECtHR, 3 
April 2007); Sahin v Turkey, App No 44774/98 (ECtHR, 10 November 2005); Dogru v France, App No 27058/05 
(ECtHR, 4 March 2009). See also O’Leary (n 113). 
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institution or in the access to a public service. For instance, X v UK concerned the 
accommodation of working time of a Muslim working in a state school; 118 SH and HV v 
Austria119 and Sessa v Italy120 dealt with the national justice system (ie a hearing date clashing with 
a Jewish holiday); Kosteski related to a request of leave of absence by an employee of a public 
utility company to attend a Muslim public holiday;121 Ebrahimian concerned a contractual agent 
working in a public hospital.122 In contrast, in the Eweida case, where the differential treatment 
arose within a private company, the ECtHR found in favour of the applicant’s right to have the 
company rules accommodated to her religious beliefs because there was ‘no evidence of any 
encroachment on the interests of others’.123 Hence, in cases where the ‘accommodation conflict’ 
arises in the private sphere and the need to preserve state’s neutrality is not at stake, the ECtHR 
seems to put a lower threshold to find that the rule is not justified, and therefore, the religious 
practice should be accommodated. 
The CJEU has not expressly endorsed the principle of reasonable accommodation beyond 
disability, but it has defined the principle of equal treatment as requiring not only that identical 
situations be treated in the same manner, but also to treat differently different situations.124 In 
Thlimmenos the ECtHR relied on that same principle to argue that Greece should have 
accommodated the applicant’s different situation, so the same logic could be followed by the 
CJEU in a case concerning an ‘accommodation conflict’. In fact, in the Prais case the CJEU 
recognised that the accommodation of religious beliefs was ‘desirable’, although not required 
in casu.125 Prais was a Jewish applicant to an open competition who requested the date to be 
changed because it coincided with a Jewish holiday that prohibits travelling or writing. When 
her request was rejected she brought a claim arguing that such practice violated the EU Staff 
Regulations, which required that candidates are selected without distinction on grounds of, inter 
alia, religion. The Court recognised that ‘[i]f a candidate informs the appointing authority that 
religious reasons make certain dates impossible for him the appointing authority should […] 
endeavour to avoid such dates’,126 which resonates with the idea of reasonable accommodation. 
On the facts, however, given that the Council was not informed of the clash before fixing the 
date and that changing the date would have disadvantaged the other candidates, the Council 
was not bound to accommodate Prais’ religious beliefs.127 
Thanks to two pending preliminary references questioning the interpretation of the EED, 
Achbita128 and Bougnaoui,129 concerning two women dismissed for wearing the hijab at work in 
Belgium and France, respectively, the CJEU now has to address the issue of reasonable 
accommodation of religious diversity at the workplace. In these two cases, the hijab was in 
conflict with the respective companies’ neutrality policies, the main difference between the two 
118 App No 7215/75 (ECtHR, 12 March 1981). 
119 App No 18960/91 (ECtHR, 13 January 1993). 
120 App No 28790/08 (ECtHR, 3 April 2012). 
121 Kosteski v Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, App No 55170/00 (ECtHR, 13 April 2006). 
122 Ebrahimian v France, App No 64846/11 (ECtHR, 26 November 2015). 
123 Eweida v UK, App Nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 (ECtHR, 15 January 2013), para 95. This 
also differentiated Eweida from the education cases (n 117), where the interests of pupils and students were arguably 
affected. 
124 Joint Cases T-18/89 and 24/89 Tagaras ECLI:EU:T:1991:8; Case T-10/93 A v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1994:39. In 
the context of the internal market, see also Case 13/63 Italian Republic v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1963:20. 
125 Case 130/75 Prais v Council ECLI:EU:C:1976:142. 
126 ibid, para 16. 
127 ibid, paras 17-18. 
128 Case C-157/15 Achbita v G4S Secure Solutions NV (pending). 
129 Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui and AADD v Micropole Univers SA (pending). 
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being that Bougnaoui had always worn the hijab and was only required not to wear it in the 
presence of clients, whereas Achbita started to wear it after having been employed for some 
time and was not allowed to wear it at all. 
Whilst the questions asked by the national courts do not directly address a potential 
accommodation duty, the central issue in both claims is whether the neutrality rule is indirectly 
discriminatory for religious employees who feel compelled to wear visible religious symbols. 
This is a golden opportunity for the CJEU to position itself as regards the ECtHR’s case law 
on religious dress, and in particular, to clarify whether, under the EU concept of indirect 
discrimination, there could be an obligation for employers to reasonably accommodate the 
needs of employees of certain religious faiths, unless the companies’ rules pursue a legitimate 
aim and are proportionate.  
In both cases, the legitimate aim seems to be quite similar to that adduced by British Airways 
in Eweida, ie the neutrality rule sought to protect the corporate image, particularly as regards its 
clients. In Eweida, however, there was no evidence of a clash with the rights of others, whereas 
in Bougnaoui a client seemed to be ‘inconvenienced’ by the headscarf. Yet, the mere fact that the 
client did not like watching her wearing the headscarf does not seem enough ground to argue 
that its ‘rights and freedoms’ were affected.130 As the ECtHR has pointed, ‘democracy does not 
simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which 
ensures the fair and proper treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a 
dominant position.’131 Furthermore, the client’s request that Bougnaoui should not wear the 
headscarf should not be interpreted as an occupational requirement132 because this exception is 
only applicable to ‘very limited situations’133 and not wearing a headscarf was not genuinely 
necessary and determining to successfully perform the substance of her job as a consultant engineer. 
On the other hand, the fact that Achbita only started to wear the headscarf after some time 
does not seem a legitimate reason to dismiss her either, given that the freedom of religion 
includes the right ‘to practise or not to practise a religion’, and to manifest one’s religion in private 
or in public.134 Arguably, then, one can start practising overtly some aspects of one’s religion at 
a given point in time for the first time, and be protected under article 9 ECHR. 
Considering that in both pending cases the arguments of the respondent companies do not 
seem sufficient to justify a restriction of the freedom of religion amounting to indirect 
discrimination, and in the light of the similarity between the ECtHR and the CJEU’s definitions 
of equal treatment, it could be expected that the latter will follow the approach of the ECtHR 
in Thlimmenos and Eweida to recognise (at least implicitly) that a duty to reasonably accommodate 
differences is inherent to the concept of indirect discrimination. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated that the incremental evolution of EU equality law has led to some 
inconsistencies in the protection against employment discrimination. It is submitted that these 
inconsistencies are not based on normative grounds, but rather on circumstantial factors. 
Indeed, human dignity is one of the foundations of EU equality law, and that entails that all 
130  Art 2(5) EED. Note also that derogations should be interpreted strictly (Case C-447/09 Prigge v Lufthansa 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:573, para 56). 
131 Sahin (n 117) para 108. 
132 Art 4(1) EED. 
133 Recital 23; see also Prigge (n 130) para 71. 
134 Sahin (n 117) para 104-105. 
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individuals are worth equal concern and respect. This supports the idea a ‘hierarchy of 
discrimination grounds’ was never meant to exist in EU law. Whilst recognizing that the 
protected grounds may have substantive features which justify the use of different tools to 
achieve equal treatment, some divergences between protected grounds undermine the internal 
coherence of EU equality law. Therefore, it seems desirable that the legal framework keeps 
evolving to address these inconsistencies. 
A first aspect that undermines not only internal, but also, external coherence, is the fact that 
gender identity discrimination is not explicitly outlawed by EU law. Indeed, it is uncertain 
whether the current protection, derived from case law, goes beyond the mere prohibition of 
discrimination against individuals who have undergone or intend to undergo gender 
reassignment. It is thus submitted that the EU should follow the increasing number of 
international recommendations that draw attention to the need to prohibit gender identity 
discrimination.135 
Secondly, whilst reasonable accommodation is a helpful tool to balance the needs of certain 
vulnerable groups and employers, at EU level it only applies to the disabled, and with a slightly 
different scope, to pregnant women. However, it could be useful not only for these groups, but 
also for ageing employees and religious minorities. Focusing on the latter, this paper has argued 
that the EU concept of indirect discrimination lends itself to an interpretation that could 
encompass a requirement to accommodate religious practices, unless the employer’s reason not 
to do it is objectively justified. Whilst embracing reasonable accommodation of religious 
practices through this interpretative solution would not be quite the same as introducing a legal 
duty to accommodate,136 it could be a good and more practicable option that the CJEU now 
has the opportunity to consider in Achbita137 and Bougnaoui.138 
Commentators are increasingly claiming that the fundamental right to equal treatment is being 
constitutionalized within EU law, but some of the current uncertainties139 and inconsistencies 
can undermine the robustness of protection at EU level and are against EU equality law 
foundations’ on human dignity. Now that the economic crisis seems to be coming to an end, 
the EU and its MS should start putting back in the agenda policy areas that were left behind in 
the last years. The changes suggested in this paper point to some of the amendments that could 
be considered in the field of equality law. Whilst achieving consensus for some of the proposed 
initiatives may not be easy, if the EU is to be increasingly seen as not just an economic market, 
but rather as a ‘constitutional market’,140 or even more ambitiously, as a ‘human rights actor’,141 it 
should strive for improving substantive coherence within equality law. 
 
135 The Commission has recently proposed new actions in this field, but they do not include expressly outlawing 
gender identity discrimination, see DG Justice, ‘List of actions by the Commission to advance LGBTI equality’ (7 
December 2015) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/lgbti_actionlist_en.pdf> accessed 1 March 2016. 
136 Alidadi (n 111) paras 707-710. 
137 Achbita (n 128). 
138 Bougnaoui (n 129). 
139 O’Cinneide (n 37) 382-384. 
140 Shuibhne (n 43) 1608-1609. 
141 M Dawson, E Muir and M Claes, ‘A Tool-box for Legal and Political Mobilisation in European Equality Law’ in 
D Anagnostou (ed), Rights and Courts in Pursuit of Social Change. Legal Mobilisation in the Multi-Level European System (Hart 
2014) 105. 
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